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In this paper we show that we can replace the assumption of constant discount rate in the one-
sector optimal growth model with the assumption of decreasing marginal impatience without 
losing major properties of the model. In particular, we show that the steady state exists, is 
unique, and has a saddle-point property. All we need is to assume that the discount function is 
strictly decreasing, strictly convex and has a uniformly bounded first-derivative. 
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 1 Introduction
Since the seminal papers of Koopmans (1960) and Uzawa (1968), economists
have broadened the class of dynamic preferences to include recursive utility
functions to tackle the problems1 arising from the assumption of constant
discount rate. Lucas and Stokey (1984) assumed increasing marginal im-
patience to ensure stability. Epstein (1987, pp.73-74) gave three reasons
why employing the assumption of increasing marginal impatience is justiﬁed.
Most studies, including the phase diagram analyses of the optimal growth
models by Chang (1994, 2004) and Drugeon (1996), have focused on this
increasing marginal impatience case.
The problems with decreasing marginal impatience are, as noted in Ep-
stein (1983, p.140), that in deterministic models there exist many steady
states and that some of them are locally unstable. The ﬁnding of “division
of countries” by Magill and Nishimura (1984) is often cited as a reason to
assume increasing marginal impatience. Speciﬁcally, Magill and Nishimura
found that if the pure rate of time preference “decreases suﬃciently rapidly”
1For example, Hicks (1965) argued that successive consumption units are supposed to
be complementary, but an additively separable utility function implies that the marginal
rate of substitution between lunch and supper is independent of the type of breakfast
one had that morning or expects to have the next morning. See Wan (1970, p.274). In
models with uncertainty, additive separability blurs the distinction between risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution. See, for example, Epstein and Zin (1989) and Duﬃe
and Epstein (1992). With additive separability, one would not care about the way in
which consumption uncertainty resolves over time; whereas recursive utility permits non-
indiﬀerence to the temporal resolution of uncertainty. See, Epstein and Zin (1989). Finally,
additive separability has a peculiar long-run implication. Speciﬁcally, when there are
heterogeneous agents, then, in the long run, the most patient consumer would own all
the capital, while all other agents consume nothing and pay back their debts with all
their labor income. See Becker (1980). For a comprehensive treatment on discrete time
recursive utility theory, the reader is referred to Becker and Boyd (1997).
2(p.281), then there exists a critical level of capital that separates the rich
countries from the poor countries in such a way that the poor countries re-
main at subsistence, while the rich countries have permanent development.
This ﬁnding, however, raises a question: What would happen to growth
t h e o r yi ft h ed e c r e m e n ti nt h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ew e r eu n i f o r m l y
bounded?
As pointed out in Lucas and Stokey (1984, p.169), the purpose of studying
r e c u r s i v eu t i l i t yi st os e eh o wf a rw ec a nr e l a xt h ea s s u m p t i o no fc o n v e n i e n c e ,
namely the assumption of constant discount rate, without losing tractabil-
ity. The question we shall address is this: Can we prove the existence, the
uniqueness, and the saddle-point property of one-sector optimal growth with
decreasing marginal impatience if the decrement in the discount function is
uniformly bounded?
To this end, we assume that the discount function is strictly decreasing,
strictly convex and that the slope of the discount function at zero consump-
tion is bounded from below. Henceforth, the latter condition is referred to
as the “bounded slope” assumption. Under this bounded slope assumption,
while keeping the usual assumptions of preferences and technologies employed
in the constant discount rate case, we show that the steady state of optimal
growth with decreasing marginal impatience exists, is unique and the steady
s t a t eh a st h eu s u a ls a d d l e - p o i n tp r o p e r t y .
The phase diagram analysis of the model can be summarized as follows.
In the constant discount rate case, the curve corresponding to the steady
state of consumption is a vertical line in the phase plane. In the decreasing
marginal impatience case, the curve corresponding to the steady state of
3consumption is obtained from “bending” a vertical line into a smooth curve
so that the upper part of the curve (relative to the steady state) is upward
sloping and the lower part is downward sloping. The upper part of the
curve is more like a bell-shaped curve than a C-shaped curve because it is
asymptotic to another vertical line. This steady state retains all qualitative
properties of the steady state in the constant discount rate case.
It is instructive to compare the stability analysis of the case of decreasing
marginal impatience with that of increasing marginal impatience because the
modeling diﬀerences between the two are in the discount function’s deriva-
tives. Borrowing the results from Chang (1994), we show that the phase
diagram analyses of stability results in those two cases are “mirror images”
of each other.
Given that the phase diagram analyses of two cases are “mirror images” of
each other and that the constant discount rate case is the limit of either case,
we present a diagram that contains all three cases. It makes clear the eﬀects
of the monotonicity of marginal impatience on the steady state consumption
and steady state capital, in comparison with a constant discount rate. It also
makes a clear statement about the stability analysis of monotonic marginal
impatience and its saddle point property.
It should be mentioned that a phase diagram analysis of one-sector op-
timal growth model with decreasing marginal impatience has been made by
Das (2003). She showed the existence and uniqueness of the steady state
under a diﬀerent stability condition. She also showed that the steady state is
locally a saddle point by examining the characteristic roots of the dynamic
system. Unfortunately, her phase diagram analysis contains an error and is
4incomplete; her stability assumption would actually impose some additional
restrictions for the growth model. Comments on Das (2003) are presented in
Section 3.4.
2T h e M o d e l
The model of optimal growth with decreasing marginal impatience is similar
to the model with increasing marginal impatience of Chang (1994). We shall
follow its framework and notation as closely as possible for easy reference
and comparison of these two cases.
The law of motion is the standard Solow equation
˙ k = f (k) − c − nk. (1)
The per capita production function f (k) is assumed to be of class C2 (twice
continuously diﬀerentiable), strictly increasing, strictly concave, satisfying
the Inada conditions:













where U (c) is the instantaneous utility function, which is of class C2, strictly








, δ (cs) > 0, (3)
is the discount factor at time t.W es h a l lr e f e rt oδ (c) as the (instantaneous)
discount function, which is also of class C2.
5Clearly, D(t) a s s u m e sv a l u e si n(0,1], depends on the underlying con-
sumption path {cs : s ≤ t},a n di sdecreasing in time because
D
0
(t)=−D (t)δ (ct) < 0.
By deﬁnition, D(0) = 1 and D
0
(0) = −δ (c0) < 0. In the classic case of




What distinguishes the case of increasing marginal impatience from the
case of decreasing marginal impatience is the functional structure of δ(c).
By increasing marginal impatience we mean δ
0
(c) > 0, and by decreasing
marginal impatience we mean δ
0
(c) < 0. In the case of decreasing marginal
impatience, we also assume δ (0) = b>0 and δ
00
(c) > 0.T h a t i s , δ(c) is
strictly decreasing and strictly convex in c ≥ 0. We also assume that δ(c) is
asymptotic to the horizontal axis δ =0so that
0 <δ(c) ≤ b. (4)




(2),s . t . (1).( 5 )
It is standard to verify that the value function of (5), in current value
form, is independent of the initial time, and depends only on the initial
capital-labor ratio. Henceforth, we denote it by J (k). For the moment, we
assume U (c) ≥ 0 so that J (k) ≥ 0;t h ec a s eU (c) < 0 will be discussed









2The method of deriving the Bellman equation, the costate equation, and the Euler





(c)J (k) − J
0
(k)=0 , (7)





(c)J (k) < 0. (8)
The second order condition (8) is clearly satisﬁed because J (k) ≥ 0.I t
follows that the optimal consumption c = c(k) is a function of k by the
implicit function theorem.
Let the costate variable be p = J
0







is clearly positive since J (k) ≥ 0. Then, the costate equation is




(k) − n − δ (c)
i
. (10)
Substituting (9) into (10),w eh a v et h eE u l e re q u a t i o n
σ(k,c)˙ c = f
0
(k) − n − δ (c) − δ
0












The numerator of σ (k,c) is negative by the second order suﬃcient condi-
tion (8). The denominator of σ(k,c) is the shadow price p,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e .
Therefore, σ(k,c) > 0 for all (k,c) and the Euler equation (11) is nonde-
generate. Notice that the sign of ˙ c is independent of the utility function
U (c).
equation is standard in the literature. See, for example, Chang (1994, 2004). The stochas-
tic version of the Bellman equation for this class of objective functions is derived in Krylov









































Since b>0,w eh a v ek1 <k 2.
















The interval [k1,k 2] is a compact set and therefore the minimum exists
and is ﬁnite. From the deﬁnitions of k1 and k2 we note that the upper
bound of −δ
0
(0) is given by the exogenous parameters such as population
growth rate n, a preference condition (δ (0) = b), the production technol-
ogy f (k), and nothing else. In other words, the upper bound of −δ
0
(0)




000 (k) > 0 or f













The economic intuition of the bounded slope assumption is quite obvi-
ous. While going from zero consumption to a positive consumption would
decrease the discount function, the decrement would not be unduly steep. In
particular, it rules out the possibility of δ
0
(0) = −∞.S i n c eδ (c) is strictly
decreasing and strictly convex in c, the same upper bound applies to all
−δ
0
(c), and hence δ
0
(c) is uniformly bounded. In other words, the discount
8function can never decrease “suﬃciently rapidly” at any consumption level c.
3.1 Steady State
The steady state of the pair of equations (1) and (11), if it exists, is denoted
by (kd,c d).B yd e ﬁnition, (kd,c d) satisﬁes ˙ k =˙ c =0 , i.e.,




(k) − n − δ(c)=0 . (13)
The curve deﬁned by (12),d e n o t e db yL1,i so fi n v e r t e d“ U ”s h a p ew i t h
k-axis intercepts 0 and
_
k, which is the same as the constant discount rate
case (and increasing marginal impatience case as well).












00 (k) < 0 and δ
0
(c) < 0.T h ek-axis intercept (c =0 )o ft h ec u r v e
L2 is k1. This means that L2 is not deﬁned for k<k 1 because δ (c) ≤ b.
For k ≥ k2,w eh a v ef
0 (k) − n ≤ 0, which implies that δ (c) ≤ 0 if (13) is
satisﬁed. In other words, L2 is not deﬁned on k ≥ k2 either. In summary, L2
is deﬁned only on [k1,k 2),a n do nw h i c h0 <f
0 (k) − n ≤ b.
As k approaches k2 from the left, f
0 (k) → n.A l o n gt h ec u r v eL2, δ (c)=
f
0 (k) − n → 0, and therefore, c →∞ . This observation says that L2 is
asymptotic to the vertical line k = k2. This asymptotic property implies
that the curve L2 must cross L1 at least once, i.e., a steady state always
exists.
9To show the uniqueness of the steady state, it suﬃces to show that the
two curves L1 and L2 cross each other only once. Since 0 <f
0
(k) − n ≤ b











(c)b, for all k ∈ [k1,k 2).
The above inequality remains valid for k = k2 because f
0 (k2)=n.O nt h e








(c) < 0 and δ
00
(c) > 0. Then the bounded slope assumption











(k), for all k ∈ [k1,k 2]. (14)
Since (14) is valid for all c>0,i ti sv a l i dw h e nc = δ
−1 ¡
f
0 (k) − n
¢
with










0 (k) − n)
¢.




greater than the slope of the curve L1, f
0 (k)−n,a ta n yp o i n ti nt h ei n t e r v a l
[k1,k 2). This makes the second crossing (including tangency) of the two
curves impossible.
The unique intersection of the two curves L1 and L2 deﬁnes the steady
state (kd,c d),w h e r ekd ∈ (k1,k 2). That is, the steady state is in the increasing
section of the L1 curve. See Figure 1. In summary, we have
Proposition 1 Under the bounded slope assumption, the steady state of op-








Figure 1: Existence and uniqueness of the steady state
Some comparative dynamics can easily be obtained. A decrease in the
p o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t e ,n, “expands” the curve L1 and shifts the curve L2
to the right as shown in Figure 2. Steady state consumption and capital
are unambiguously increased. This result is quite intuitive because there are
simply fewer people to feed and to share the existing capital. Similarly, an
increase in Hicks-neutral technical progress, i.e., a shift of the production
function from Af (k), A =1 ,t oAf (k), A>1, would also expand the
curve L1 and shifts the curve L2 to the right as shown in Figure 2. Again,
steady state consumption and capital are unambiguously increased. This is
also quite intuitive because such a technological change represents a scale
eﬀe c to np r o d u c t i o na n dh e n c eo nc o n s u m p t i o n . I nb o t hc a s e s ,t h er e s u l t s




Figure 2: Comparative Dynamics
constant discount rate.
3.2 Phase Diagram
Let the curve deﬁned by ˙ c =0be L3 : R(k,c)=0 ,w h e r e
R(k,c)=f
0
(k) − n − δ (c) − δ
0
(c)[f (k) − c − nk]. (15)
The location of the curve L3 can be determined as follows. First, we recognize
that L1 and L2 divide the ﬁrst quadrant of the (k,c)-plane into four sectors:
A, B, C, and D. See Figure 3. In sector B we have R(k,c) < 0, because it
is the region above the curve L1 (i.e., f (k) − c − nk < 0)a n db e l o w( o rt o
the right of) the curve L2 (i.e., f
0 (k) − n − δ(c) < 0). Therefore, the curve
L3 : R(k,c)=0cannot lie in this sector. Similarly, in sector C we have








Figure 3: The curve L3 lies in region A and region D.
0) and above (or to the left of) the curve L2 (i.e., f
0 (k) − n − δ (c) > 0).
Again, the curve L3 : R(k,c)=0cannot lie in this sector. Therefore, the
curve L3 : R(k,c)=0must be located in sector A (above L1 and L2)a n d
sector D (below L1 and L2). When L3 is in sector A, we have k<k 2.
Similarly, when L3 is in sector D, we have k1 <k<
_
k.
Next, we examine the behavior of the curve L3 in the strip S deﬁned by
S = {(k,c):k ∈ [k1,k 2]}.












using (14). Applying the implicit function theorem to the curve L3 : R(k,c)=









(c)[f (k) − c − nk]
f
00 (k) − δ
0
(c)[f
0 (k) − n]
. (16)
Note that the implicit function theorem applies to all points of R(k,c)=0
in S.I n e q u a l i t y(14) implies that the denominator of (16) is negative on S.
Then the sign of dk/dc depends only on the sign of the numerator of (16).
Since δ
00
(c) > 0, dk/dc has a sign opposite of ˙ k.
If (k,c) lies above L1,i . e . ,f (k) − c − nk < 0,t h e n˙ k<0 and hence
k is increasing in c. Similarly, if (k,c) lies below L1, k is decreasing in c.
At (kd,c d), dk/dc equals zero. Thus, the curve L3 in the strip S can be
obtained from “bending” the vertical line k = kd i n t oas m o o t hc u r v es o
that the upper part of the curve (above (kd,c d)) is upward sloping and the
lower part is downward sloping. See Figure 4. Using the expression of a
“C-shaped” curve for L3 would be misleading because the upper part of L3
is asymptotic to another vertical line k = k2; a bell-shaped curve would be
a better description of the upper part of L3. Moreover, the upper part of L3
stays in the strip {(k,c):kd ≤ k ≤ k2}, which is smaller than S.
If the lower portion of L3 stays in S, then the description of L3 is complete.






, the curve is still downward sloping. This
is because in this region, f
0 (k) ≤ n, which implies Rk (k,c) < 0,a n dt h e
implicit function theorem is still applicable. In any event, the lower part of
L3 stays in the strip
n





Now we are ready to determine the vertical arrows of the phase diagram.
Since Rk (k,c) < 0 on [k1,k 2], R(k,c) > 0 in the region to the left of L3.






Figure 4: The steady state is a saddle point
the right of L3. In summary, the vertical arrows are as follows:
˙ c<0 if (k,c) is to the right of L3;
˙ c>0 if (k,c) is to the left of L3.
The horizontal arrows are the same as the constant discount rate case, i.e.,
˙ k<0 if (k,c) is above the curve L1;
˙ k>0 if (k,c) is below the curve L1.
Combining all arrows, a complete phase diagram is shown in Figure 4.
The linearized system of equations of the nonlinear system (1) and (11),
using the facts that f

























(The method of linearization in stability analysis is standard. See, for exam-
ple, Brock and Malliaris (1989).) The characteristic equation of the linearized
system is
λ
2 − δ (cd)λ + φ(kd,c d)=0 .
Since Rk (k,c) < 0 on the strip S,a n dσ (k,c) > 0,w eh a v eφ(kd,c d) < 0.
It implies that the discriminant of the characteristic equation is positive
([δ (cd)]
2 − 4φ(kd,c d) > 0) and the product of the characteristic roots is
negative. Thus, the two characteristic roots are real and opposite in sign,
and the steady state is a saddle point. Such a steady state is unstable;
however, as shown in Figure 4, there is a stable branch converging to (kd,c d)
and an unstable branch diverging from it.
Proposition 2 The steady state of the optimal growth model with decreasing
marginal impatience is a saddle point.
3.3 The case of U (c) < 0
If U (c) < 0,t h e nJ (k) < 0.I nt h i sc a s ew en e e dt oassume that the second













The inequality (17) says that the degree of convexity of δ (c) is greater than











































the last inequality is obtained from (8). It is then straightforward to verify
that the properties such as the existence, the uniqueness, and the saddle
point property of the steady state remain valid.
It is interesting to point out that, in the case of increasing marginal
impatience, (8) and p>0 are automatic if U (c) < 0. But assumptions (8)
and (17) are required for p>0 if U (c) ≥ 0. In that case, assumption (17)
simply says that δ (c) is more concave than U (c). See Chang (1994) and
Drugeon (1996) for details.
3.4 Comments on Das (2003)
As mentioned before, Das (2003) has made great stride in analyzing the op-
timal growth with decreasing marginal impatience. She showed the existence











, for all k ∈ (0,k 2]. (18)
She also showed that the steady state is locally a saddle point by verifying the
two characteristic roots are opposite in sign. Many equations in Das (2003)
bear a close resemblance to our equations. For example, the costate equation
(10) corresponds to her equation (12). Euler equation (11) corresponds to
her equation (15) [after applying her equation (23)]. Equation (16) that
17determines the steady state consumption curve ˙ c =0is the reciprocal of her
equation (A.23).
But there are problems in her analysis. The domain of (18) is (0,k 2].
As k → 0,w eh a v ef
0
(k) →∞and inequality (18) may fail. Similarly,
inequality (18) may fail if δ
0
(0) is unbounded. Imposing conditions on f
00
(k),
as k → 0, to tackle the aforementioned problems would not relax assumptions
imposed for analytical convenience. In contrast, we do not have this problem
because our bounded slope assumption is deﬁn e do na ni n t e r v a l[k1,k 2] away
from k =0 . We also think that our bounded slope condition is intuitively
appealing.













Inequality (18) is obtained by substituting c = c(k)=f (k) − nk into (19)
so that (18) c a nb ew r i t t e na sg(k,c(k)) < 0. In so doing, the inequality













so that dk/dc is zero at (kd,c d). What Professor Das failed to recognize is
that the function g(k,c) is continuous in the (k,c)-plane because f (k) and
δ (c) are of class C2. By continuity, if g (kd,c d) < 0, then we must have












in some neighborhood of (kd,c d). Therefore it is impossible for the denomi-
18nator of (16) to change signs in that same neighborhood of (kd,c d).I n s t e a d ,
Professor Das argued that the sign of the denominator of (16) is ambiguous.
This error led Professor Das to draw the conclusion that the curve L3 may
be of “S” shape as represented by her Figure 3. Professor Das’s descrip-
tion of the L3 curve, and therefore the corresponding stability analysis, is
incomplete.
In addition, Das (2003) studied only the case with U (c) > 0;o u rs t a -
bility results, however, apply to growth models with decreasing marginal
impatience whether U (c) > 0 or U (c) < 0. We are able to do this because
we take the dynamic programming approach. As pointed out by Drugeon
(1996, p.284), dynamic programming method is appealing because “it allows
for a simpliﬁed analysis of the optimal path over the plane.”
4 All Cases Considered
It would be useful and instructive to compare all cases (decreasing marginal
impatience, constant marginal impatience, and increasing marginal impa-
tience) in a single framework and in the same diagram. To this end, we
borrow from Chang (1994) the results of the case of increasing marginal
impatience in which δ (c) > 0, δ
0
(c) > 0 and δ
00
(c) < 0.
The curve deﬁned by (13), denoted by L4, is downward sloping, dc/dk <
0, due to f
00 (k) < 0 and δ
0










Therefore, the curve L4 intersects the curve L1 at its upward sloping portion








Figure 5: Existence and uniqueness of the steady state (increasing marginal
impatience)
that, unlike the decreasing marginal impatience case, the steady state (ki,c i)
is uniquely determined without a bounded slope assumption.
The curves L1 and L4 partition the ﬁrst quadrant of the (k,c)-plane into
four sectors. It can be veriﬁed that the curve L5 : R(k,c)=0is located in
sector B that is above the curve L1 and to the right of L4, and in sector C
that is below the curve L1 and to the left of the curve L4.S e eF i g u r e6 .
The phase diagram can be obtained similarly. Let the curve deﬁned by
˙ c =0be L5 : R(k,c)=0 ,w h e r eR(k,c) is deﬁned in (15).I t i s s h o w n i n






for any c. Therefore, the location of the curve L5 is in the strip










Figure 6: The curve L5 lies in sector B and C










< 0, i.e., (14) is always satisﬁed.
Notice that we do not need to assume a bounded slope condition in this case.
The phase diagram of optimal growth with increasing marginal impatience
is drawn in Figure 7.
The case of constant impatience δ (c)=δ is well-known. See, for example,
Intriligator (1971). In that case, the curve associated with ˙ c =0(or f
0 (k)−
n − δ =0 ) is a vertical line, k = k0,w h e r e
k0 = f
−1 (n + δ).
The phase diagram is reproduced in Figure 8.
To make meaningful connections among the three cases, we have to relate
the constant δ in the constant discount rate case to δ (0) in the other two















fN(k) = n + *
L2
L4
Figure 9: Comparison of the location of the steady states
k0 = k3)s ot h a tδ (c) >δfor all c>0. In the decreasing marginal impatience
case, we assume δ (0) = b = δ (i.e., k0 = k1)s ot h a tδ (c) <δfor all c>0.
Treated this way, the constant discount rate becomes the limiting case of
both decreasing and increasing marginal impatience growth models. Figure
9 shows the relative position of the steady states among the three cases.
Figure 10 shows that the eﬀect of changing from constant marginal im-
patience to monotonic marginal impatience is simply to “shift and bend”







Figure 10: To change from constant marginal impatience to non-constant
one is to bend the vertical line k = k0
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we show that we can replace the assumption of constant dis-
count rate in the one-sector growth model with decreasing marginal impa-
tience without losing any major properties of the model. In particular, the
major properties such as the existence, the uniqueness, and the saddle point
property of the steady state remain valid. All we need is to assume that the
discount function is convex and has a uniformly bounded ﬁrst-derivative.
We also show that the phase diagram analysis of the optimal growth with
decreasing marginal impatience is a “mirror image” of the phase diagram
analysis of the optimal growth with increasing marginal impatience, and
that the constant discount rate case can be regarded as the limiting case of
24either model. All three cases are qualitatively equivalent under reasonable
assumptions. From this perspective, the assumption of constant discount
rate is more of a restriction than convenience, at least for the continuous-
time one-sector optimal growth model.
The bounded slope assumption is closely related to the work of Magill and
Nishimura (1984). However, it is not always true that continuous-time results
would automatically imply discrete-time ones, nor the converse. See Chang
(1988, 2004) for discussion. The eﬀects of the bounded slope assumption
o nt h ed i s c r e t et i m em o d e l sr e m a i nt ob ei n v e s t i g a t e d . T h i si sf o rf u t u r e
research.
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